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Abstract While most of the research work in the field of
electrical engineering was aroused by the scientific chal-
lenges to be overcome, it is fair to recognize that the prac-
tical importance of engineering hinges on its economic im-
pact on the market, the whole society and the environment.
Thus, nowadays economic modeling, analysis and optimiza-
tion of the electricity market is of the utmost significance.This
work presents an aggregated economic analysis of the Brazil-
ian electricity distribution companies using an economic model
of a regulated market. The fundamental agents (consumer,
power utility, government, society) are represented in the
TAROT - Optimized Tariff Model, which is applied to the
majority of the distribution companies in Brazil, based on
public real data available from ANEEL - the Brazilian elec-
trical energy regulatory agency. This reveals the economic
flows in the regulated market of each company, and also
presents their financial status in terms of over-investments
or under investments compared to optimal investments and
positive, negative or zero economic value added of each com-
pany. Moreover, the model analysis show the socio-economical
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1 Introduction
The deregulation of electricity sector in Brazil was mainly
driven by the necessity of attracting private capital to invest
on infrastructure, as an attempt to make up for the scarcity
of public resources in the early 90s (Arango et al. (2006)).
Presently, at the 20th anniversary of ANEEL, the Brazil-
ian electrical energy regulatory agency, it raises the ques-
tions regarding the changes implemented by the authorities
and electricity market agents and their consequences. As al-
ready known, the deregulation process was not straightfor-
ward and adjustments had to be made along the way. By the
mid of 2001 an energy crises took place and most part of
the country had to join a national plan for rationing energy
consumption. The crises was intensified due to the drought
that reduced water levels at hydroelectric dams. However it
became very clear that the regulation’s structure did not well
provide appropriate conditions for attracting investment on
power generation (Pereira et al. (2004)).
In response to these events, the new government in 2003
reformulated the institutional model of the electricity sector
and new rules were created to guarantee the expansion of
power generation. The role of the Distribution Companies
(DisCos) becomes a key factor in this new structure, since
they must predict and contract the amount of required en-
ergy to supply their consumer market five years in advance
through bilateral contracts which, in the big picture, works
as the main financier of the expansion of power generation
and increases the reliability of the sector due to a better
planning of the expansion of the generation. However, on
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the other hand, the DisCos are exposed to the risks associ-
ated with forecasting, long term contracts and the penalties
in cases of subcontracting (Homrich et al. (2012); Alvarez
(2007); Medina Macaira et al. (2016); Jardini et al. (2002)).
Despite the liberalization and the introduction of market
rules, especially in the generation segments, the electricity
transmission and distribution continued to function as natu-
ral monopolies and, for this reason, price regulation became
very important as it restrains any power monopoly abuse.
In this context, one of the most relevant aspects of the re-
cent reforms introduced in the electricity power sector is the
search for a price model that preserves the interests of con-
sumers, guarantees the profitability of investors and stim-
ulates sector efficiency (Pereira et al. (2004); Arango et al.
(2008); Pereira and de Almeida (2013); Pereira et al. (2015);
Cortez et al. (2018a,b); Arango et al. (2019); Cullmann and
Nieswand (2016); Scalzer et al. (2019); Costa et al. (2019);
Arango et al. (2017, 2011)).
Intensive studies have been done towards the best price
model for the retail market. The efforts show that imple-
menting rules to simulate a competitive market in a monopoly
environment is a big challenge with no global answer (Joskow
(2008)). The purpose of this paper is to provide an eco-
nomic overview of the utility companies in Brazil using the
economic model of the regulated electricity market called
TAROT (Optimized Tariff). What this paper seek to answer
is if the regulatory framework designed for the distribution
power system in Brazil is assuring the maximization of the
social welfare produced by the activity. Are the designed
rules allowing the system to evolve itself? Are the Discos
investing efficiently in their power grids? Does the share-
holder remuneration signal an attractiveness to the activity?
The approached used here is based on real data applied
in an economic model based on the same regulatory premises
adopted by ANEEL. In Section 2 it is briefly presented the
regulatory mainframe and the regulated economic market
model (TAROT) applied for the DisCos. Section 3 shows the
financial regarding the Brazilian DisCos and it is followed
by the results in Section 4 and the conclusions in Section 5.
2 An Economic Market Model for the Regulated
Electricity Distribution Activity
The electrical power system in Brazil consists of about 52
DisCos and in order to create a standard and establish gen-
eral procedures for calculating the energy price, ANEEL
created the Tariff Regulation Procedures (PRORET) (ANEEL
(2016)). This document, which has a normative character,
consolidates the rules to determine the energy prices for the
retail market. In general terms, the prices are reviewed pe-
riodically within four or five years, depending on the con-
cession contract of the DisCos. The regulation methodol-
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Tariff Review Cycle
Fig. 1 Tariff Review Process (Cortez (2018)).
year to guarantee the maintenance of the economic and fi-
nancial balance of the utility and to avoid that the energy
price would suffer the corrosion of the inflationary process.
Figure 1 illustrates the tariff revision and tariff readjustment
processes in which an utility company has to undergo in or-
der to obtain the energy price for its retail market.
The tariff review process starts at Year 0 and it happens
in two stages. First, the regulator determines the tariff at a T0
level through the process of tariff re-positioning. The sec-
ond step is to design efficiency gains and productivity goals
for the respective tariff cycle (Year 0 to Year 4), and from
these values the regulator defines the X Factor. Productivity
gains from market growth and reduction of operational costs
achieved by efficient management are appropriated annually
by the DisCo. However, Factor X reduces the tariff annually
to protect the consumer by encouraging the DisCo towards
efficiency. In Year 4 the DisCo is submitted to a new tariff
review process (some contracts stipulate 5 year cycles).
2.1 TAROT Model - Optimized Tariff
The TAROT model was developed to represent a DisCo in
a simple way in order to capture the essential aspects of its
economic and financial performance (Arango et al. (2008);
Pereira et al. (2015)). Illustrated in Fig. 2, the TAROT model
with the economic flows in a regulated electricity market,
presents the main structures and the transactions carried out
among the stakeholders of the electricity market: utility, gov-
ernment and consumers. The model places the distribution
activity in an economic modern perspective of aggregated
economic value for the society, expressed by EWA (Eco-
nomic Welfare Added) (Jehle and Reny (2001)). A portion
of the EWA relates to the consumers surplus by the ECA



























Fig. 2 TAROT (Optimized Tariff) model with the economic flows in a
regulated electricity market. Adapted from (Arango et al. (2008)).
(Economic Consumers Added) and another portion refers
to the value added to the company, the EVA (trademark of
Stern & Stewart Co. for Economic Value Added).
The economic benefit of the consumer (U), also known
as utility or willingness of the consumer to pay for electric-
ity, reflects the principles of eagerness (a) and satiety (b).
Thus, it can be modeled by the following expression:
U = a ·E− b
2
·E2 [MR$] (1)
where E [MWh] represents the total amount of consumed
electricity and U [R$] represents the electricity utility eco-
nomic value for the customers.
In order to simplify, the model treats the energy as a
product with a single tariff price (T [R$/MWh]). Therefore
the DisCo, as the energy supplier to the consumer, has a
gross revenue (GR) calculate as forward:
GR = T ·E [MR$] (2)
The consumer eagerness can be calculated as a function
of the energy tariff (T ) and the demand-price elasticity of
the electric energy consumption (ε):






















All the expenses of the company are deducted over its
revenue. Under the Brazilian law, the taxation takes place on
sales and on profit. The tax rate on sales (µ) varies accord-
ing to the state of the country (based on the data collected it
ranged from 15% to 35%). Yet, the rate on profit (t = 34%)
is the same for the whole country (9% CSSL and 25% IRPJ).
The company has also to cover its operational costs (G) (Eq.
5) and depreciation (D). At last, the invested capital must be
remunerated (Y ). The rate of the remuneration (rw) is cal-
culated according to the methodology used by ANEEL for
WACC (Weighted Average Capital Cost) (ANEEL (2015))
and the invested capital is represented by the Regulatory Re-
muneration Base (B).




where e is the coefficient of network operating costs in
[R$/MWh] and p is the loss coefficient in [R$2/MWh2].
This assumption is obviously a simplifying approxima-
tion of what happens in practice. However, it allows an or-
ganized and methodical treatment of the subject in academy,
power industry, regulatory personnel and hopefully, general
consumers.
Another parameter that can be extract from the model is





where EBIT DA stands for Earnings Before Interest, Taxes,
Depreciation and Amortization.
2.2 The regulatory optimization of the electricity market
using TAROT
The regulatory goal is to maximize the socioeconomic wel-
fare value created by the electricity market under the circum-
stances of natural monopoly. How to avoid abusive market
power? How to guarantee the quality of the service in a fair
way to the consumer and, at the same time, to ensure the
financial survival of the DisCos?
The solution design by ANEEL and implemented in the
model is based in two optimization principles. First the com-
pany expenses must be minimal, which require an optimal
value for the network investment (B∗ in Eq. 7), called by
ANEEL as Prudent Investment. This optimization condition
ensures that the company will neither be under-invested nor
over-invested. Since the remuneration for the shareholder
depends on the B value, it would be expected that the reg-
ulated company could seek for unnecessary investment in
order to increase its profit with low risk, since the WACC
is guaranteed by regulatory contract. This measure also pre-
vents network assets from being below of what is necessary
for the proper operation and reliable functioning of the grid.
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Fig. 3 Formulation of the TAROT model. Adapted from (Arango et al.
(2008)).
From the TAROT model, the optimal investment (B∗) can be






where B∗ is the optimal investment, k = d+ rw/(1− t), d is
the depreciation rate, rw is the WACC, and t is the govern-
ment tax on companys revenue.
Secondly, and at last, the energy tariff should represent
a price that cover all the companies expenses and results in
EVA≥ 0. For this, ANEEL determined that the EVA should
be zero and it is said that the company is in Financial Eco-
nomic Equilibrium (FEE), condition set at the beginning of
the first year of the Tariff Review Process (Year 0 in Figure










By consequence, the model also provides the optimal en-





The complete model formulation is presented in Fig. 3.
2.3 The EVA optimization of the distribution company
using TAROT
Consider a virtual scenario where there is no regulation de-
termining the price and thus limiting the electricity price or
tariff. In this case, it is expected that the company would
seek the maximization of its profit. Therefore, using the TAROT







E2 +(a−µa− e)E− kB (10)
The value for EVA can be expressed as a second degree
concave function. Thus, based on the consumer behaviour of
the market, EVA has a maximum value EVAmax for a given







Thus the company can determine a tariff price (T ′) using
Eq. 9 that, due to the eagerness and satiety of its consumer
market, will results into an amount of sold energy (E ′) that
maximizes its EVA.
Note that in the TAROT model, the consumer behaviour
consider its eagerness (a) and satiety (b) and it is not inelas-
tic as generally assumed.
3 Economic Modeling and Simulation of the Electricity
Market with real data
Based on the technical and economic data published by ANEEL
in the tariffs review processes of the Brazilians DisCos, it
was developed a methodology to derive and adjust the input
parameters for the use of TAROT model (Cortez (2018)).
The Annual Tariff Adjustment (RTA) and Periodic Tariff Re-
view processes (RTP) occur in dates defined in the conces-
sion legal agreements. Each tariff process is approved at a
public board meeting of ANEEL and only then the tariffs
are published by means of a Homologatory Resolution. The
data from all of the tariff processes since 2013 are avail-
able in ANEEL website through the SPARTA worksheets
(ANEEL (2017b)).
The name of the DisCos and the dates of the used tariff
processing are shown in Table 1. The company CERR have
not undergone a tariff revision process since 2013, which
makes it impossible to model the company due to lack of
available data. CPFL Santa Cruz and ENERGISA SS are
new DisCos resulted from recently grouping (ANEEL (2017b);
Cortez (2018); ANEEL (2017a); Energisa Sul-Sudeste (2017))
and, therefore, do not have a tariff review, and can not be
modeled as well. The TAROT model was applied to 49 Brazil-
ian DisCos, among private and public companies. The data
collection refers to a period of one year before the day of
the tariff review process. The size of the utility companies
in Brazil varies severely, and the graphic in Fig. 4 shows
how much each company has of the national retail energy
market.
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Table 1 Last tariff processes of the Brazilian Utility Companies
(Cortez (2018)).
Company Process Tariff EVA
(State) Month Real Optimal Real
/Year [R$/MWh] [MR$]
AES ELETROP. (SP) 07/17 447.14 439.68 150.75
CEB-DIS (DF) 10/17 485.99 495.94 -33.55
CEEE-D (RS) 11/17 744.81 609.80 482.23
CELESC-DIS (SC) 08/17 431.86 409.47 257.39
CELG-D (GO) 10/17 605.61 555.31 294.48
CELPA (PA) 08/17 723.27 671.53 220.49
CELPE (PE) 04/17 484.53 476.93 49.34
CEMAR (MA) 08/17 698.57 617.98 219.03
CEMIG-D (MG) 05/17 371.14 417.42 -723.65
CERR (RR) - - - -
CHESP (GO) 11/17 828.19 712.12 5.43
COCEL (PR) 06/17 546.83 514.62 3.97
COELBA (BA) 04/17 469.96 461.64 47.20
COPEL-DIS (PR) 06/17 492.87 473.19 241.47
COPERALIANÇA (SC) 08/17 366.79 460.80 -14.64
COSERN (RN) 04/17 469.91 461.34 20.81
CPFL Paulista (SP) 04/18 448.52 408.82 624.26
CPFL Piratininga (SP) 10/17 419.74 375.92 291.84
CPFL Santa Cruz (SP) - - - -
DEMEI (RS) 07/17 700.64 665.39 2.86
DMED (MG) 11/17 492.67 408.20 12.15
EDP ES (ES) 08/17 463.14 436.96 120.98
EDP SP (SP) 10/17 406.98 349.40 431.35
EFLJC (SC) 08/17 736.75 707.94 0.22
EFLUL (SC) 08/17 412.42 418.46 -0.29
ELEKTRO (SP) 08/17 457.95 425.63 260.93
ELETROB. AL (AL) 09/17 671.99 568.13 175.68
ELETROB. AM (AM) 11/17 616.12 524.98 59.24
ELETROB. PI (PI) 09/17 814.96 641.34 262.63
ELETROB. RR (RR) 11/17 621.91 542.74 38.74
ELETROCAR (RS) 07/17 674.88 639.70 1.96
ELFSM (ES) 08/17 706.55 643.44 15.43
ENEL CE (CE) 11/17 503.83 507.85 -41.87
ENEL RJ (RJ) 03/18 724.60 670.39 222.74
ENERG.BO (PB) 02/18 609.27 545.97 18.25
ENERG. SS (SP-PR) - - - -
ENERG. MG (MG) 06/17 600.61 577.86 14.67
ENERG. MS (MS) 04/18 599.78 581.11 33.76
ENERG. MT (MT) 04/18 667.88 628.92 134.32
ENERG. NF (RJ) 06/17 607.65 599.26 -0.39
ENERG. PB (PB) 08/17 589.19 534.99 99.94
ENERG. SE (SE) 04/17 434.50 413.50 34.54
ENERG. TO (TO) 07/17 711.89 656.70 57.23
FORCEL (PR) 08/17 399.49 405.66 -0.19
HIDROPAN (RS) 07/17 634.61 597.13 1.09
IENERGIA (SC) 08/17 477.42 465.12 1.17
LIGHT (RJ) 03/18 622.28 593.14 350.94
MUXENERGIA (RS) 07/17 546.80 505.16 1.25
RGE (RS) 06/17 469.77 450.95 82.73
RGE SUL (RS) 04/17 482.64 524.75 -175.59
SULGIPE (SE) 05/17 543.55 558.75 -2.94
UHENPAL (RS) 05/17 567.67 602.64 -1.17
23 Companies: < 
1% of the Market
5%


































Fig. 4 Percentage of the energy consumed in the country (market
share) for the regulated power distribution companies in Brazil.
In addition to the data extracted from the tariff review
processes, it is also necessary to calculate the value of demand-
price elasticity (ε) of electric energy consumption. The value
of ε of each company was calculated using the definition of
elasticity (Eq.12) and the companies’ historical data of tariff







With the data collection from ANEEL (2017b) and using
the formulation presented from Eq. 1 to 5 and Fig. 3 it is
possible to calculate the TAROT economic parameters of
each distribution company. It is also possible to optimize
each DisCo using the regulatory assumptions from Section
2.2.
4 Economic Analysis of the Brazilian DisCos using
TAROT
4.1 Tariff
From the data collection and economic modeling using TAROT,
the first analyses made, before optimization, was the evalu-
ation of the electricity tariff (T ) paid by the final consumer.
The values found for T vary from 0.367 [R$/kWh] to 0.828 [R$/kWh]
and the average is 0.547 [R$/kWh]. The average price in
Euro is 0.106 [e/kWh] and in Dollar is 0.122 [US$/kWh].
On the other hand, the price paid by the companies for
purchasing electrical energy from the power suppliers varies
from 0.120 [R$/kWh] to 0.245 [R$/kWh] and the average
value is 0.175 [R$/kWh].
Once the companies were optimized, the electricity tar-
iff average value calculated was 0.525 [R$/MWh] varying
from 0.349 [R$/MWh] to 0.712 [R$/kWh], showing that, in
general, the tariffs applied by the companies are not optimal
and surcharge the customer.








Fig. 5 Financial Economic Status of the Brazilian DisCos. For EVA =
















Fig. 6 Tariff and the Financial Economic Status (EVA < 0, EVA ≈ 0,
EVA > 0) of the DisCos.
4.2 Financial Economical Status of the Brazilian DisCos
The next evaluation made using TAROT is regarding the
DisCos status of their EVA value before optimization con-
sidering that EVA = 0 represents that the company is in Fi-
nancial Economic Equilibrium (FEE). Using one year data
for each company, it is resulted that 6 out of 49 (12%) of the
Brazilian DisCos presented a negative value for EVA. This
means that the respective tariffs of these companies are not
enough to cover all their expenses in the distribution busi-
ness as it is being managed. There are 34 (69%) companies
with a tariff above from what is necessary (Fig. 5). At last,
using a tolerance of 1% over the Gross Revenue for a status
of FEE (EVA = 0), it was found that 9 (18%) companies are
operating with EVA close to zero.
The graphic in Fig. 6 shows the growing ordered value
of the electricity tariff (T ) of each distribution company in
Brazil with the correspondent financial economic status (EVA<
0, EVA ≈ 0, EVA > 0). Among the lowest tariffs, one can
find companies with EVA positive, negative and close to
zero. On the other hand, the companies with the highest tar-
iffs are all with EVA > 0. Therefore, one can question if
the highest tariffs represents thoroughly higher costs or only
higher profits.
To compare the companies performance is not an easy
task since there is a big discrepancy between the size and





































Fig. 8 Correlation between Normalized Operational Costs and the Tar-
iff before DisCos optimization.
and Table 1. The last tariff processes of the Brazilian Utility
Companies (Cortez (2018)) are presented in Table 1, includ-
ing the Company Process (State), the Real and the Optimal
Tariff [R$/MWh] and the Real EVA [MR$]. Bigger compa-
nies have higher revenues and, therefore, it is not accurate to
compare the companies due to the absolute value of EVA. In
order to solve this issue one can use the Return over Invest-
ment (ROI) defined in Eq. 6, since it gives a normalized fi-
nancial result for each company. The graphic of Fig. 7 shows
a correlation of 46,13% between the values of ROI and T .
Also, one can normalize the operational cost of the com-
panies as it is done for ROI (13). The correlation found be-
tween N$Op and T is of -2,67%, as shown in the graphic of
the Fig. 8. These two graphics indicate that the higher tariff





4.3 Network Investment in the Grid by the DisCos
After the optimization of the tariff using the regulatory as-
sumptions, one can compare the value for the network in-
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vestment using the original data (B) and the optimized one
(B∗). It is found that only 6 (12%) companies are currently
operating at an optimal investment value. It is alarming the
high number of over-invested companies, 36 (74%). And
7 (14%) are under-invested, as shown in Fig. 9. This fact
explains why high electricity tariffs are more related with
higher profits than with higher costs: over-investments (B>>
B∗) with the aims to maximize profit for the shareholders,
against the regulatory premises of maximizing the socioe-
conomic welfare, through a fare tariff for all.
The regulatory premises proposed by ANEEL seem to
be fair for all market agents, and they are formally expressed
in the concession contracts with typically 30 years period
(which is a guarantee of market share), signed by all dis-
tribution companies. The problem for the managers of the
DisCos seems to be complying with all the complexities and
dynamics of the electricity market regulation, together with
all the uncertainties in the countrys economical and politi-
cal scenario, and under the constant pressures from interna-
tional shareholders to maximize profits, no matter what hap-
pens internally. Representatives of the DisCos may create
lobbies to promote changes in regulations in order to balance
the business risks. However, the regulation itself becomes
an asset by guaranteeing the companies financial economic
equilibrium (FEE) with a specified WACC throughout tariffs
increases. Therefore, operational efficiency through costs min-
imization is not as effective as financial efficiency through
over-investments (B) in the grid, which capital yield (Y) can
be recognized in the tariff revision process and are directly
transferred to the tariffs, which are paid by the final cus-
tomers. Moreover, the diversity and information asymmetry
among DisCos and ANEEL in such a big country, makes
that the technical-economical regulation is not an easy task
for the regulatory agency as well.
The authors intended to show in this work that by using
the Tariff Optimization Model (TAROT) to represent eco-
nomic flows in the Brazilian regulated electricity market,
the agents and their respective aggregated economic values
could be better revealed than by going through the more
complex and detailed regulatory procedures (PRORET) im-
plemented by ANEEL. In fact, having a view of the whole
picture of this game is not an easy task. Therefore, engineers
working in a distribution company, researchers and students
in academia, regulators and policy makers can benefit from
the use of TAROT. The TAROT was originally created by
Prof. Hector Arango at UNIFEI - The Federal University
of Itajubá in collaboration with Professors from USP - The
University of São Paulo during the evolution of the regula-
tory changes in the Brazilian electricity sector. The TAROT
proved useful for conceptual as well as practical researches
with Distribution Companies in Brazil. More easily it has
become a didactic model to teach students about the reg-







Fig. 9 Comparison of the original investment B and the Optimal B∗.
However, as far as it is known, it has not been used in other
countries, which may have distinct regulatory policies. This
is not a limitation, but a potential for the use of the modeling
principles.
4.4 Aggregated Company for the whole country
The idea of using the TAROT to represent a hypothetical
Aggregated Company for the whole country, based on all
the data from the distribution companies, can allow the sim-
ulation of distinct scenarios for optimization: regulatory op-
timization (maximize EWA, with EVA = 0, resulting in a
fair Tariff T ∗); or EVA optimization (in a ”electricity mar-
ket [environment] without regulation, i.e., only governed by
capital owners and open market forces”, including the con-
sumers behavior, resulting in EVAmax, Tmax, EWAmin), This
exercise, will show the flexibility of the TAROT model to
be used for policy makers and regulators when designing
the regulatory premises, as well as by any electricity market
agent to evaluate the economic impact of policies on their re-
spective economic aggregated values. Therefore the TAROT
Model offers flexibility and generality to be applied to each
DisCo or to an equivalent aggregated company representing
a whole sector.
In order to have an economic and financial general overview
of the Brazilian Power Distribution System, the data from all
the DisCos were added and modeled in a unique aggregated
company (AgDisCo). The input data is presented in Table 2.
The value for the energy tariff (T ) differs here from the
average calculated in Section 4.1 because it is calculated us-
ing the total revenue divided by the total market.
The operational costs are shown in Table 3. From Fig.10,
it is possible to note that almost 50% of the operational cost
is used in the purchase of bulk electricity, 11% with connec-
tions and use of the Transmission and Distribution systems.
The Sectorial Charges are those defined in the legislation
representing a burden of 22%. Over 16% of the expenses
include administration, operational and maintenance costs.
Besides, it is noticed from Table 3 that over 18% of the
energy purchased by the DisCos is lost, which represents
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Table 2 Aggregated data from the 49 DisCos.
Elasticity - ε 14.82 %
Tax rate on sales - µ 27.38 %
Tax rate on profit - t 34.01 %
Depreciation rate - d 3.85 %
Remuneration rate - rw 7.94 %
k 15.89 %
Total Revenue (readjusted) 153,019.10 [GR$]
Market - E 416.74 [TWh]
Energy Tariff - T 505.64 [R$/MWh]
Regulatory Base for Assets - B 87,813.70 [MR$]
Table 3 Aggregated Operational Cost from the 49 DisCos in [MR$].
Administration and O&M 21,694.70
Sectorial Charges 28,956.90
Electric Power Purchase 65,484.16
Transmission and Distribution 14,579.65
Other Revenues 848.51
Others 2,380.92
Total Operational Cost 132,247.82
Electric Power Losses [TWh] 67.00













Fig. 10 Operational Costs.
Table 4 Parameters of AgDisCo
Eagerness - a 3,916.58 [MR$/TWh]
Satiety - b 8.18 [MR$/TWh2]
Operational Cost Coef. - e 290.24 [MR$/TWh]
Loss Coefficient - p 5,994.83 [MR$2/TWh2]
billions of Reais (approximately 3 billions of dollars annu-
ally).
With the original data, before optimization, from Tables
2 and 3 and using the TAROT formulation from Section 2
one can model the AgDisCo. The TAROT model and the
calculated parameters are shown in 11 and Table 4, respec-
tively.
The AgDisCo was optimized using the regulatory as-
sumptions from Section 2.2. The calculated parameters and
the TAROT model are shown in Table 5 and Fig. 12 , re-
spectively. Note, by comparing the EWA values from Fig. 12
with the EWA value from Fig. 11, that the EWA- Economic




710,744.96 GR = 210,721.35
Tax S = 57,702.26
NR = 153,019.09
EWA G = 132,814.05
714,869.77 EBITDA = 20,205.04
D = 3,384.62
  EBIT = 16,820.43
Tax P = 5,721.04
EVA    EBI = 11,099.38
4,124.81 Y = 6,974.57
Original Data
Fig. 11 TAROT for AgDisCo using the Original Data.
Table 5 Optimal TAROT for AgDisCo using Regulatory Assump-
tions.
Optimal Price Tariff - T ∗ 419.30 [R$/MWh]
Optimal Market - E∗ 484.70 [TWh]
Optimal Investment - B∗ 81,441.38 [MR$]




719,497.39 GR = 203,235.63
Tax S = 55,652.43
NR = 147,583.20
EWA G = 134,641.66
719,497.39 EBITDA = 12,941.54
D = 3,139.01
  EBIT = 9,802.54
Tax P = 3,334.09
EVA    EBI = 6,468.45
0.00 Y = 6,468.45
Regulatory Optimization
922,733.02
Fig. 12 Optimal TAROT for AgDisCo using Regulatory Assumptions.
Welfare Added to Society from this optimization is in the or-
der of 4.6 billions of Reais, approximately, 1.09 billions of
Dollars annually. In this optimized scenario, the Y or Capi-
tal Yield of the Aggregated Company is in the order of 6.4
billions of Reais, almost 1.52 billions of Dollars annually).
From this perspective, one can get a broad overview of the
electricity Brazilian Market, according to the premises used
in this modelling. What really counts is that the optimiza-
tion of the electricity sector strongly and positively affects
the economy of a country, since it is in the base of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) production.
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Table 6 Optimal TAROT for AgDisCo using Profit Maximization’s
Assumptions.
Optimal Price Tariff - T ′ 2,137.70 [R$/MWh]
Optimal Market - E ′ 217.34 [TWh]




193,310.83 GR = 464,609.61
Tax S = 127,225.00
NR = 337,384.61
EWA G = 66,306.60
362,980.50 EBITDA = 271,078.01
D = 3,384.62
  EBIT = 267,693.39
Tax P = 91,049.15
EVA    EBI = 176,644.25
169,669.67 Y = 6,974.57
Profit Optimization
Fig. 13 Optimal TAROT for AgDisCo using Profit Maximization’s
Assumptions.
The AgDisCo was also optimized using the profit max-
imization assumptions from section 2.2. The calculated pa-
rameters and the TAROT model are shown in Table 6 and
Fig. 13, respectively. Note now, by comparing the values
with the ones from the previous scenario (12), that reversely,
in an electricity market without regulation, i.e., only gov-
erned by capital owners and open market forces, the Tariff
grows 4.4 times, the Energy Consumption reduces to half,
but the EVA grows 41 times, and Government Taxes grows
about 3.4 times, however the EWA reduces to half. That
means more concentration of finances in shareholders and
government hands and economic recession in the develop-
ment of a country.
5 Conclusions
This work has presented an aggregated economic analysis
of the Brazilian electricity distribution companies using an
economic model of a regulated market. The economic flows
of fundamental agents (consumer, power utility, government,
society) were represented in the TAROT - Optimized Tariff
Model, which was applied to the majority of the distribu-
tion companies in Brazil, based on public real data available
from ANEEL - the Brazilian electrical energy regulatory
agency. This has revealed their financial status in terms of
over-investments (74% of the companies) or under-investments
(14% of the companies) compared to optimal investments
(12% of the companies) and positive (70%), negative (12%)
or zero (18%) economic value added (EVA) of each com-
pany. Moreover, the model analysis showed the socioeco-
nomic welfare added to society in face of different opti-
mization objectives: maximizing the socioeconomic welfare
added to society by the electricity market (max EWA, sub-
jected to EVA = 0) resulting in fare electricity tariffs, or
maximizing the economical value added to shareholders of
the company (maxEVA) resulting in even more high fares,
high government taxes and lower electricity consumption
causing economic recession.
The relevance of this work is its didactic yet coherent
demonstration of the tariffs and the financial economic sta-
tus of the Distribution Companies (DisCos), as well as of an
equivalent whole aggregated company for Brazil. The nov-
elty in applying the TAROT model is that all main market
agents (consumer, power distribution company, government
with the regulatory agency tariff revision process) and their
economic fluxes are represented in the model. Then, the reg-
ulatory premises set by ANEEL (or any public policies im-
pacting the electricity sector) can be evaluated qualitatively
and quantitatively, aiming at the calculation of fare tariffs
for all agents. For example, in order to maximize the so-
cioeconomic welfare added (EWA∗) by the electricity mar-
ket, subjected to setting EVA = 0 in every regulatory cy-
cle (thus always guaranteeing a weighted average cost of
capital (WACC) for the company), TAROT allows the cal-
culation of the optimized investments (B∗) for each power
distribution company of the country. This reveals the finan-
cial economic status (EVA < 0, EVA≈ 0, EVA > 0) of each
company, as demonstrated along the paper, allowing actions
to better planning and operation of the present power distri-
bution market, which should operate with optimized tariffs
(T ∗).
Therefore, it is a contribution to stimulate critical discus-
sion about an economic issue, which is believed to be rele-
vant to the public and to legislators, as well as to students,
researchers and professional engineers in the power indus-
try. Moreover, in order to design new market regulation and
new business models for smart grids with distributed, renew-
able and energy storage resources, as well as to evaluate the
impact of growing prosumers on the traditional electricity
market, the TAROT model can be useful. But at first, it is
fundamental the transparent comprehension of the current
business and regulated market economic model. Otherwise,
the market power trap mechanism can break any sustainable
innovation in this sector.
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https://repositorio.unifei.edu.br/xmlui/handle/123456789/1486
Cortez C, Arango H, Bonatto BD (2018a) Stochastic TAROT R©
model: Stocastic economic market model for risk evalu-
ation of a regulated electricity distribution company. In:
2018 Simposio Brasileiro de Sistemas Eletricos (SBSE),
IEEE, pp 1–6, DOI 10.1109/SBSE.2018.8395700, URL
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8395700/
Cortez C, Arango H, Bonatto BD (2018b) Study case of the
stochastic TAROT R© model: Comparison of the eco-
nomic performance of Brazilian Electric Power Distribu-
tion Companies considering the inherent risks of the sec-
tor. In: Simposio Brasileiro de Sistemas Eletricos (SBSE),
IEEE, pp 1–6, DOI 10.1109/SBSE.2018.8395729, URL
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8395729/
Costa MA, Mineti LB, Mayrink VD, Lopes ALM (2019) Bayesian
detection of clusters in efficiency score maps: An appli-
cation to Brazilian energy regulation. Applied Mathemati-
cal Modelling 68:66–81, DOI 10.1016/j.apm.2018.11.009, URL
https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0307904X18305365
Cullmann A, Nieswand M (2016) Regulation and investment incen-
tives in electricity distribution: An empirical assessment. Energy
Economics 57:192–203, DOI 10.1016/j.eneco.2016.05.007, URL
https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0140988316301256
Energisa Sul-Sudeste (2017) Relatório da Administração e
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